Anti-ISIS Operations (Iraq & Syria)

During the period of July 5-12, 2026, intelligence reports indicate that elements of the Islamic State (ISIS) maintained a notable level of activity across several Iraqi governorates, specifically Nineveh, Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Diyala. The group's operations were primarily concentrated in remote desert regions, rural areas, and along key transportation routes, reflecting a continued reliance on insurgent tactics designed to exert pressure while avoiding direct, large-scale confrontations with security forces. Documented incidents included armed assaults, ambushes, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, agricultural arson, kidnappings, and targeted killings. These actions underscore ISIS's adaptive strategy of low-cost, high-impact operations aimed at destabilizing local governance and security. Key operational and logistical environments for remaining ISIS cells continue to be identified in the western Nineveh Desert, the Anbar Desert, the Akashat–Rutbah corridor, the Makhoul mountain range, the Hamrin Mountains, and the Tarmiyah area north of Baghdad. These areas provide terrain conducive to clandestine movement, hideouts, and the planning of attacks, leveraging their remoteness and often challenging accessibility for security forces. In response to this persistent threat, Iraqi security forces have continued their counter-terrorism efforts. On July 5, 2026, Iraqi fighter jets conducted three airstrikes targeting suspected ISIS positions along the border area between Kirkuk and Erbil provinces in northern Iraq. These strikes aimed to disrupt ISIS hideouts and operational infrastructure. Hours prior to these airstrikes, the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service successfully neutralized one ISIS militant during a security operation conducted near the town of Altun Kupri. These actions demonstrate the ongoing commitment of Iraqi forces to pursue and degrade ISIS remnants across the country, even as the group attempts to plan occasional armed attacks against military and police personnel. The broader strategic context in Iraq is significantly influenced by the impending conclusion of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) by September 30, 2026. This transition marks a critical juncture, as the international coalition's combat mission in Iraq officially ended in 2021, shifting to an advise-and-assist role. The full withdrawal of international forces raises concerns among regional security experts about a potential security vacuum that ISIS could exploit. Experts warn that Iraq could be entering its most dangerous period since the fall of Mosul in 2014, with ISIS 'actively waiting in the gaps.' The group's historical modus operandi involves exploiting instability and governance weaknesses. A significant factor in Iraq's internal security landscape is the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a broad coalition of Iraqi militias that initially formed in 2014 to combat ISIS. While formally integrated into Iraq's security apparatus and playing a crucial role in defeating ISIS territorially, the PMF remains a complex entity. It comprises numerous factions, some with strong ties to external regional powers, operating with considerable autonomy despite receiving government funding. On July 29, 2026, coordinated strikes were carried out by external powers against positions belonging to the PMF north of al-Miqdadiyah district in Diyala province. These strikes highlight the intricate and often tense relationship between various security actors within Iraq and the broader regional geopolitical rivalries, which can inadvertently create opportunities for ISIS to regroup or exploit divisions. The continued presence and influence of these diverse armed groups, some operating outside direct state control, complicate Baghdad's efforts to establish unified security governance and effectively counter the enduring ISIS threat. The intelligence community assesses that while ISIS's territorial control has been eliminated, its underlying networks and ideological appeal persist. The group's ability to conduct hit-and-run operations, target infrastructure, and recruit from grievances suggests a recalibration rather than a complete defeat. The ongoing challenges of securing vast desert areas, managing internal political dynamics, and addressing socio-economic factors that fuel extremism remain central to Iraq's long-term counter-ISIS strategy. The effectiveness of Iraqi security forces in maintaining pressure on ISIS cells will be paramount as the international coalition's presence diminishes, requiring robust intelligence gathering, targeted operations, and sustained efforts to deny ISIS safe havens and resources.

In Syria, the landscape of anti-ISIS operations has undergone significant shifts, particularly in early 2026, marked by the withdrawal of external forces and a realignment of internal power dynamics. On April 16, 2026, external forces evacuated their last remaining personnel from the Qasrak base in Hasakah Province, transferring control to the Syrian army following an agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This withdrawal concluded a decade-long military presence aimed at countering ISIS. This strategic shift followed an offensive by the Syrian government in early 2026, which dislodged the SDF from non-Kurdish areas, bringing provinces like Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, historically central to the ISIS insurgency, under the control of the new Syrian state. While grievances among local populations persist, the resentment towards perceived Kurdish dominance, which ISIS previously exploited, has reportedly diminished. Consequently, the tempo of ISIS attacks in Syria has seen a notable decrease, moving from multiple incidents per week to less than once a week on average. Initial attacks in early 2026 primarily involved IEDs or small-arms fire targeting SDF patrols and checkpoints. However, the current trend indicates a shift towards targeted assassinations of Syrian government officials, sporadic ambushes of government forces in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, and occasional major attacks in urban centers like Damascus. The Syrian government has actively stepped up its counter-terrorism measures. On July 28, 2026, internal security forces, in cooperation with the General Intelligence Service, conducted a joint security operation in Aleppo and its surrounding countryside. This operation resulted in the arrest of an unspecified number of individuals affiliated with ISIS and the seizure of significant quantities of weapons, ammunition, and explosives in Aleppo and Al-Bab. This follows a broader three-month counter-terrorism campaign conducted by the Ministry of Interior in June 2026, which led to the dismantling of several ISIS cells, the arrest of 235 operatives, and the confiscation of weapons and explosives. These actions demonstrate a concerted effort by the Syrian authorities to consolidate control and suppress ISIS activity within areas under their jurisdiction. A significant political development occurred in November 2025 when Syria formally joined the international coalition against ISIS, becoming its 90th member. This move marked a departure from its previous non-membership despite the coalition's operations in Syria and Iraq since 2014. In February 2026, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani participated in a meeting of political directors of the anti-ISIS international coalition in Riyadh. Discussions at this meeting focused on the security situation related to ISIS activity in Syria and Iraq, assessing remaining threats, preventing resurgence through sleeper cells, and strengthening security and military coordination. This engagement signals Syria's intent to be a more integrated partner in regional counter-terrorism efforts, particularly following the fall of the previous regime in late 2024 and the new administration's focus on tightening nationwide security. Despite these efforts, the threat posed by ISIS in Syria remains acute. The group continues to exploit existing instability and security gaps. Concerns persist regarding the management of ISIS detainees and displaced persons. In January 2026, following the SDF's acquiescence, over 15,000 ISIS-affiliated detainees reportedly escaped from the al-Hol camp after Syrian authorities assumed control and failed to adequately contain the facility. This incident, along with the transfer of 5,704 ISIS detainees from Syrian detention facilities to Iraq in early 2026, highlights the ongoing challenges in managing the large population of individuals associated with ISIS and the potential for these individuals to rejoin militant networks. The abrupt handover of detention facilities and IDP camps to Syrian transitional government forces has weakened local security structures, creating a critical window for ISIS resurgence. The strategic situation in Syria is further complicated by the broader regional geopolitical landscape. While the Syrian government has made strides in stabilizing its domestic situation and eroding ISIS's support zones through economic recovery and institution-building, the group's ability to adapt and recalibrate its tactics remains a concern. The ongoing efforts to integrate the SDF with Syrian government forces, despite initial agreements, present potential vulnerabilities that ISIS could exploit if containment efforts falter. The international community, including external powers, continues to monitor the situation closely, recognizing that a stable and unified Syria is crucial for regional security and the enduring defeat of ISIS.

The strategic situation regarding ISIS in Iraq and Syria is characterized by a complex interplay of military operations, political transitions, and persistent threats of resurgence. While ISIS has been territorially defeated in both countries, intelligence assessments indicate that the group is actively recalibrating its strategies and exploiting emerging security gaps. A significant development is the ongoing withdrawal of external forces from the region. The international coalition's counter-ISIS mission, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), is set to conclude in Iraq by September 30, 2026. This follows the end of the combat mission in 2021 and a transition to an advise-and-assist role. In Syria, external forces completed their withdrawal from the Qasrak base in Hasakah Province on April 16, 2026, transferring control to the Syrian army. These withdrawals, particularly from Iraq, have raised serious concerns among security experts about a potential security vacuum that ISIS could exploit. Experts warn that the period following the withdrawal could be the most dangerous for Iraq since 2014, as ISIS has historically thrived in unstable environments. The collapse of the previous Syrian government in 2024 has further complicated the regional security landscape. Iraqi intelligence estimates suggest a significant increase in ISIS fighters in Syria, from approximately 2,000 to as many as 10,000, since the change in government. This surge in numbers is attributed to ISIS taking advantage of the security collapse and the subsequent turmoil. While some analysts suggest that the overall scale of ISIS attacks in Syria has not seen a major shift, with militants primarily conducting small hit-and-run operations, the increased presence of fighters is a clear indicator of the group's reconstitution efforts. The issue of ISIS detainees and displaced persons remains a critical vulnerability. In early 2026, external forces confirmed the transfer of 5,704 ISIS detainees from facilities in Syria to Iraqi detention centers to prevent further escapes. This transfer was part of a broader effort to manage the thousands of former ISIS fighters and affiliated individuals held in various camps and prisons. However, the abrupt handover of these facilities, including the massive Al-Hol displacement camp, to Syrian transitional government forces in early 2026 led to significant security breakdowns. Reports indicate that over 15,000 ISIS-affiliated detainees escaped from Al-Hol after authorities failed to properly contain the facility. These mass escapes, coupled with disturbances and attempted breakouts in other detention sites, underscore the acute risk of ISIS elements rejoining active networks and increasing their operational capacity. The physical infrastructure of these facilities, limited staffing, and overcrowding have been identified as key factors enabling these breakouts. Despite the challenges, there are ongoing efforts to counter ISIS. The Syrian government has intensified its counter-terrorism campaigns, leading to arrests and the dismantling of cells. Syria's recent decision to join the international anti-ISIS coalition in November 2025 and its participation in coalition meetings in February 2026 signal a potential for increased cooperation in combating the group. However, the strategic negligence of the international coalition in completely eradicating ISIS, focusing instead on territorial defeat, has allowed the group to preserve its structures in desert areas. The underlying political, governance, economic, and security problems that breed extremism in Iraq and Syria have reportedly worsened since 2011, providing fertile ground for ISIS recruitment and ideological reproduction. The group's strategy involves controlling territory, building an army, and inspiring followers by establishing an 'Islamic state.' While its focus is primarily on Iraq and Syria, its ambitions extend to other states in the Muslim world. The current situation is a delicate balance. While the number of ISIS attacks in 2026 is historically low compared to its peak, there have been spikes in activity, particularly in Syria. The group's ability to adapt its modus operandi, exploit regional instability, and leverage the challenges in managing detainees and displaced populations means that the threat of ISIS resurgence remains a significant concern for regional and international security. The effectiveness of future counter-terrorism efforts will depend on sustained pressure on ISIS networks, improved security cooperation among regional actors, and comprehensive strategies to address the root causes of extremism.